Thank you very much for inviting me to give testimony before this Committee. You have my CV before you. I would like to draw your attention in particular to my work over the past several years in training NATO officers – specifically the command group – for peace support and crisis stabilization operations including Afghanistan. My role as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the exercise simulation is to help foster unity of effort and close cooperation between the military mission and the UN political mission so that the military effort supports the overarching peace process.
I would like to situate my remarks today in the context of what has come before. I am a member of the Afghanistan Reference Group. I helped prepare the document that formed the basis for presentations last November by Stefan Lehmeier of the Peace Operations Working Group of the NGO network, Peacebuild which I chair and of Gerry Ohlsen, of the Group of 78, of which I am a past President. I wish also to associate myself with the testimony of Graeme MacQueen of MacMaster University and, in the new round of hearings now underway, of Seddiq Weera, of the Afghanistan Ministry of Education and before that, also of MacMaster University.
Stefan Lehmeier, Graeme MacQueen, Gerry Ohlsen, and Seddiq Weera, have all come before you asserting that there is an urgent need for a reorientation of the international focus in Afghanistan from the failing counter-insurgency campaign to the development of a comprehensive multi-dimensional peace process, based on UN best practices in diplomatic peacemaking and ideally led by a high level UN envoy of the stature of a Lakhdar Brahimi, someone acceptable to all sides of the conflict, and with deep knowledge and understanding of the region and of the craft of negotiation. Professor Graeme MacQueen outlined some ideas, already tested on the ground in Afghanistan, on engendering local dialogues as the first step toward a more formal negotiating process. Seddiq Weera talked about his discussions with many disaffected Afghan fighters, warlords, drug lords, Taliban commanders, and so on, about their willingness to negotiate, about their desire for ‘peace with honour’. He also talked about the impossibility of the Karzai government ever making real progress on good governance when their primary concern of is ‘watching their backs’ as the Taliban and other armed forces aligned with them make seemingly inexorable gains in their battle for control of Afghanistan.
I associate myself fully with all these remarks.
The urgency is even greater now as the security situation continues to deteriorate, to the extent that the former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, in a report for the Atlantic Council, has called the military situation a “strategic stalemate” while some other analysts would go further and say the momentum is now with the insurgents.
Since your preliminary report was released, we have heard from the Manley Panel. I would draw the Committee’s attention to some key insights in the narrative of the Manley Report, which are fully in line with the analysis offered by ARG members.
The deteriorating security situation is noted on page 12. There is the recognition on page 17 that the current fighting is a continuation of the thirty-year civil war and an acknowledgement of the need for an “eventual political reconciliation” and for Canada to support ad hoc efforts to this end.
On page 27, there is a recognition of the key role of regional actors and the complexities of the situation. I quote:
“Beyond its own borders, Afghanistan is surrounded by a violence-prone region.
The mountainous western reaches of Pakistan, along the boundary with
Afghanistan, harbour Afghan insurgents who are reinforced by recruits from
countries around the Gulf and further abroad. Pakistan’s own domestic political
upheavals and recurring crises—and its concerns about India’s growing economic
and political presence in Afghanistan—complicate the region’s geopolitics. Iran, to
Afghanistan’s West, has been a source of arms trafficking into Afghanistan. The
actions of regional powers require focused consideration as policy-making
proceeds. Canada, in concert with key allies, should adopt a coherent diplomatic
strategy that addresses regional risks and engages all the region’s actors, in
particular Pakistan, to establish a more stable security environment. “
On page 33 there is a call for Canada to press for a “comprehensive political-military strategy” and for more coherent leadership of the international effort.
Having concluded that more of the same will lead to failure in Afghanistan, the Report then sets out a series of specific recommendations. In addition to those relating to more troops and helicopters from NATO, a more robust Canadian diplomatic position is recommended including a heightened focus on the regional dimension and Canadian support for the early appointment of a high-level civilian representative of the UN Secretary General is urged.
But when the precise wording of these recommendations is considered, one finds they do not actually include anything about Canada seeking support from within NATO and the international community more broadly for a new political framework for Afghanistan with diplomatic peacemaking at its heart. The role of the new UN Special Envoy is to be specifically focused on “ensuring greater coherence in the civilian and military effort,” which surely is secondary to the development of a winning political strategy around which to align the diverse array of international actors in Afghanistan.
As for the regional dimension, here is the recommendation:
“Forceful representations with Afghanistan’s neighbours, in particular with Pakistan, to reduce the risks posed to regional stability and security by recent developments in that country”.
No country could possibly have been more forceful than the USA in seeking to get Pakistan to reign in the Taliban and Al Qaida in the border areas. It didn’t work. Exhortations, no matter how forceful, must be buttressed with international support for processes that address the deep democratic deficit that is at the root of Pakistan’s insecurity. The results of the recent elections in Pakistan offer a new opening to begin to do this, given the stated desire of the winners to pursue political dialogue with disaffected local leaders in the border areas.
What about the strategic review of Afghanistan policy now ongoing in NATO, the results of which will be announced at the Bucharest Summit in April?
The Manley Report is silent on any inputs by Canada to this process other than to push for greater military-civilian coherence, focusing instead on the idea that the Canadian government should concentrate its efforts on getting NATO to agree to 1000 additional soldiers as a condition for Canada’s continued military participation in the South.
It seems to me that Canada should be using its very hard won influence within NATO to seek to secure the support of the Alliance’s 26 member states (comprising much of the key donor countries in Afghanistan as well as troop contributors) for what is most urgently needed – a new overarching political framework for international engagement in Afghanistan with much, much more emphasis on creating the conditions for a comprehensive peace process. I believe that there is already a lot of support for this approach, not least within those NATO countries opposed to their forces participating in the counterinsurgency military effort. Eminent persons like Lakhdar Brahimi have spoken out about the urgent need for diplomatic peace making. What is lacking is a country willing to take a leadership role within NATO to secure agreement on this new approach.
I have not addressed the revised motion before Parliament to extend Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. I would be pleased to take questions on that important topic. It follows from my opening comments, however, that a reorientation of the military mission alone is, in effect, putting the cart of military support before the horse of a winning political strategy to bring a sustainable peace to Afghanistan.
Thank you.